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Abstract 
 
This paper presents the main issues related to the financing of urban logistics solutions, more precisely 
to the contribution of economic analysis on strategic decision support related for urban logistics 
financing, focusing on cost benefit analysis. First we present the main funding strategies in urban 
economics, mainly in the field of urban logistics. Second we address the contribution of cost benefit 
analysis by recalling the main methodology and adapting it to urban logistics. Third we apply the method 
to the example of deploying a delivery space booking network, and illustrate the application via a set of 
three examples containing different situations and scenarios, which are presented, assessed and discussed. 
From the different simulations, it is observed that the way the system is financed has strong impacts on 
both its individual cost (for potential users) and its attractiveness.  
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1. Introduction 
Urban goods transport is a necessary but disturbing activity. To deal with the main 
nuisances related to it, which are mainly congestion, noise, global warming and local 
pollution, public and private stakeholders have studied and developed methods and 
solutions of different nature and dimensions. In transport research, we observe hundreds 
of works dealing with the subject of urban freight, but the number of operational urban 
logistics systems is very small. One of the most popular systems is based on the notion 
of urban consolidation centre (UCC). Indeed, although several projects have been 
developed and tens of pilots and demonstrators have been seen in the last ten years, 
most of them end without a deployment of the developed technologies or organizational 
solutions (Allen et al., 2012, Gonzalez-Feliu et al., 2013a). However, also a few projects 
have resulted on operational solutions nowadays implemented or in mature solutions 
able to be deployed. In the first group we observe the UCCs of Padova (Gonzalez-Feliu 
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and Morana, 2010) and Parma (Morganti, 2011) in Italy, the railway system of Samada 
Monoprix (Delaître and De Barbeyrac, 2012) in Paris, France, or the Postdamer Platz 
consolidation centre in Berlin, Germany (Oustin and Guihéry, 2012). Indeed, the 
successful stories are more an exception than a rule, and in other fields, like ICT, 
logistics pooling or home deliveries, most solutions have difficulties to become 
economically continuous, mainly due to a non-habit of examining their socio-economic 
suitability in a similar way that on transport infrastructure projects (Bonnafous and 
Faivre d’Arcier, 2013). 
In literature, we observe several works dealing with transport project financing and 
socio-economic assessment, but most of them are related to transport infrastructures or 
public transport networks. Concerning urban logistics, Browne et al. (2004) investigate 
the collaboration fields among public and private stakeholders, comparing narrow 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), mainly related to co-financing projects and sharing 
costs, risks and benefits, and wide PPPs, which are other forms of collaboration not 
always involving co-financing and risk sharing. Van Duin et al. (2008) propose a 
provocative vision of the trend that consist to promote UCCs and show via the 
identification of costs and benefits when and how an UCC can be viable. However, in 
both works, no socio-economic analyses are carried out in terms of generalised cost-
benefit comparison over a time period, which would allow public and private decision 
makers to orient their choices. Such analyses, although often presented in literature 
(Nuzzolo et al., 2012; Wygnoki and Goodchild, 2012; Ambrosini et al., 2013) are more 
related to a global public authority’s vision without investigating the financing issues 
but the impacts in terms of congestion and pollution. We think that it is important to 
give researchers and practitioners the ways to assess economics of deploying urban 
logistics projects since it is an emerging question and becomes a need for public and 
private stakeholders
1
. 
This paper aims to propose, via a case study, a methodology to assess the viability of 
urban logistics projects. Such methodology is adapted from that used in other transport 
fields to the specificities of urban logistics. First, a brief overview of financing 
mechanisms in urban economics is proposed, as well as its application to urban 
logistics. Then, the basis of a cost-benefit analysis is presented, focusing on how it can 
be used for city logistics projects. After that, an example of deploying a Delivery Space 
Booking (DSB) network on Lyon (France) is proposed based on the results of an 
evaluation carried out in Bilbao (Spain), a city which is similar to Lyon. Finally, three 
examples of use of a Cost Benefit Analysis for strategic decision support are proposed, 
having as basis the given example. Various scenarios are defined, assessed and 
discussed to show the interests of economic analysis for strategic decision support 
related to financing questions. 
 
2. Refunding mechanisms in urban logistics 
Financial structures and refunding mechanisms are wide subjects of research that have 
many direct applications and usages in urban transport, mainly in infrastructure and 
public transport planning. However, those subjects are much less usual in urban 
                                               
1 During the SUT conference in Goteborg, in April 10-12, 2013 (http://lindholmen.se/sv/node/28149), 
such issues were addressed and a big interest of both scientific and practice communities was made on 
assessing the capacity of projects to become economically viable. 
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logistics. According to Gonzalez-Feliu et al. (2013b), this can be explained by the 
cohabitation and usually the conflicts between two main viewpoints: that of public 
planners and that of private operators. Public planners’ aims are directly related to 
policy assessment, deployment and evaluation (Ambrosini et al., 2008; Gonzalez-Feliu 
et al., 2013c). Private operators goals deal mainly with on carrier-based planning tactics 
and strategies (Crainic and Laporte, 1997). In any case, it is necessary to provide the 
necessary funds to make the investments needed, and this for both public and private 
entities. We find three families of refunding approaches: that of collective utility, that of 
users’ refunding, and a wide variety of mixed approaches, Although traditionally the 
two first families have been seen as being in direct conflict, the development of 
approaches from the third family show that they can co-habit and combining them in a 
synergic way can improve the economic viability of a project (Browne et al., 2004; 
Bonnafous et al., 2006). In this section we examine the three families of approaches. 
2.1 Collective utility and user’s refunding 
Collective utility can be defined as the socio-economic interest that a project can 
bring to a society (see for example Mills, 1994, O’Sullivan, 2007). In collective utility 
viewpoints, the initial investments and operational costs are paid by public authorities 
(O’Sullivan, 2007). Following this logic, funds must come from the public taxes (either 
local or national) without any requested monetary return to refund them. Collective 
utility is associated to the construction of free infrastructures, like national and regional 
public roads, public parking areas and delivery bays or electronic accesses to limited 
traffic areas. To justify public utility, a system must be proven socio-economically 
viable (Gonzalez-Feliu et al., 2013b). To prove that viability Cost Benefit Analysis is 
often used, as seen in infrastructure investment (Hayashi and Morisugi, 2000). 
Examples of projects funded on a collective utility viewpoint are the Limited Traffic 
Zone parking areas in Bologna, Italy (Spinedi, 2008) or the Proximity Logistics Spaces 
in Bordeaux, France (Gonzalez-Feliu et al., 2013b). 
User’s refunding strategies consist on making the user pay for benefiting the system 
or the service, more precisely make transport carriers, retailers and/or shippers pay a fee 
for using an urban logistics service. That strategy is often motivated for economic 
reasons and the systems in this category need to be economically viable. For that reason, 
it is needed to show, via economic analysis the viability of the system on a monetary 
basis (Mills, 1994). Examples of this strategy are most highways in Europe and, in 
urban logistics, German Urban Consolidation Centres (Oustin and Guihéry, 2012) or 
Dresde’s cargo-tram (Gonzalez-Feliu, 2008). 
2.2 Combined viewpoints 
In urban logistics, the main refunding approaches are mixed because of a common 
factor of most projects: investment costs are difficult to be entirely refunded. For that 
reason, public authorities accept to partially finance them, then to make them 
operational and economically viable (for operational costs and a part of the 
investments). However, combined viewpoints are various in nature and structure and it 
is not always easy to properly identify all of them. We however propose a 
categorization of mixed approaches (Bonnafous et al., 2006). 
The most common strategy is that of private funding with public intervention. In this 
viewpoint the public authority does not have an economic benefit with its financing 
contribution. Indeed, public bodies do not get refunded back, but help private 
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stakeholders to make the projects economically viable, assuming that public utility 
justifies a partial collaboration to funding without asking an economical return. We find 
three main forms of public intervention: 
 Delegation: public authorities cover a part of the investments (or not) and give a 
private company the structures to make a service. Sometimes (like in public 
transport) they cover a part of operational costs, in other cases (like Vicenza’s 
UCC) they cover only the investments and give free usage of the structures, but the 
operational costs have to be covered by the private company. This is common in 
highway projects, and some public transport networks, and has been seen in some 
UCCs: Parma (Morganti, 2011) and Vicenza (Ville et al., 2012) in Italy, La 
Rochelle (Trentini et al., 2010) in France. 
 Subsidies: subsidies are economic helps that must not be refunded back. Such 
support can be direct (like in Genova UCC) or indirect. Direct subsidies are in 
general under public market regulations and follow a system of calls. Projects 
receive in this way a direct economic support from public bodies, which covers a 
part or the totally of the investment costs and operational costs for a period 
considered enough to ensure the system’s economic viability. Note that several 
public bodies propose direct subsidies: the European Commission via several 
support programs, each country national institutions, regional bodies, local bodies 
or non-governmental associations (Trentini et al., 2012). Indirect subsidies are in 
general not direct economic support to the project but ways to decrease some costs, 
such as real estate or manpower. The most popular example is that of Chronopost, 
at Paris, France, where the real estate stakeholder owning the logistics spaces got a 
subsidy to reduce land prices in order to allow Chronopost to pay a suitable price 
(Trentini et al., 2012). Indeed, it is very difficult to develop logistics activities in the 
city centre without public intervention because the high values of real estate prices. 
 Public loans: this is the case of low interest credits to help the development of 
urban logistics systems. Those economic helps must be refunded back to the public 
authority but interests are in general set in a direct relation to inflation, so they are 
more convenient that classical loans. This is the case of several projects like the 
AMI program of the French National Agency of the Environment
2
. 
  
We find also approaches combining various strategies, like in Padova’s UCC, where 
the facility was already owned by the operator. In that case, costs for feasibility analysis 
and demonstration were not refunded (as paid directly by public authorities), but 
vehicles were bought on the name of the public transport operator, and given free to the 
operator. We also observe several types of narrow Public Private Partnerships, which 
are popular in public transport but are limited few cases in urban logistics (Browne et 
al., 2004). 
 
                                               
2 http://www.ademe.fr 
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3. Applying Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) to urban logistics 
3.1 Basic notions of cost-benefit analysis 
 
Cost-benefit analysis methods (CBA) are very popular in economics, and can be often 
seen in transport infrastructure or public transport network strategic planning (DG 
REGIO, 2008). Generally, a CBA method consists on listing on one side all investment 
and operational costs, year after year, for a given time horizon (in general 10 years for 
infrastructure projects, according to Bonnafous and Faivre d’Arcier, 2013). Then 
benefits are also listed in the same time horizon. After that, for each year, benefits are 
confronted to costs and their difference is updated using an update rate in order to take 
into account the money updating year after year. Finally, an Investment Return Rate 
(IRR) after the project’s time horizon is calculated. In order to take into account the 
pluri-annual time horizon, it is important to define an updating rate a which allows 
comparing two quantities of money at two different periods. Taking the value of a 
quantity of money Vt at time t, and Vn the value of this quantity at horizon n, they are 
related by the following equation: Vt = Vn/(1+a)n. 
Then, year by year, benefits are confronted to costs and their difference is updated 
using an update rate of 4%. Finally, an Investment Return Rate (IRR) is calculated, in a 
10-year horizon. IRR is calculated using only economic data, i.e., direct monetary costs 
and incomes, and represents the capacity of refunding an investment. When dealing 
with public authorities, it is also suitable to define the indirect costs and benefits, i.e., 
those which do not take the form of monetary values, such as pollution, stress, security, 
etc. and monetise them. A return rate based on the generalised costs can be then 
estimated. This rate is called Economic Return Rate (ERR) and is often used in socio-
economic evaluations. In any case, we would like to note that CBA must be adapted to 
the assessed context, and are strongly dependent on the hypotheses and assumptions 
made when defining the scenarios to assess. In this paper we do not aim to provide 
innovation in CBA methodical structure but to study the different hypotheses and 
assumptions made to adapt such methods to assess technological solutions in the field of 
urban logistics. For more details on the general methodology of Cost Benefit Analysis, 
see Layard and Glaister (1994). 
 
3.2 Context, scenario characteristics and assumptions 
The different scenarios and situations will be based on development and deployment 
trends for a delivery space booking (DSB) system like the one tested in Bilbao (Spain) 
within the FREILOT project. The system consists on a network of delivery bays 
equipped by a booking system (via for example a parking machine or a website) where 
drivers or transport carriers can book some of the proposed slots. Users can book in 
advance (mainly via the website) or, in real time one they arrive to the delivery bay, but 
this second option is possible only if free space is still available when the driver arrives 
to the delivery bay. When a driver who has booked a slot parks on the delivery bay, he 
must identify using an id card via the parking machine. The delivery bays are not 
equipped of physical barriers to avoid illegal parking, but a sensor system indicates if a 
vehicle is parked, and via an online communication with the reservation server, it 
checks if the identified driver (if any) corresponds to the user who booked if the slot 
was already booked. If a vehicle is on the delivery bay and either no driver has 
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identified nor the identified driver does not corresponds with the user who booked the 
slot, a light signal indicates the illegal situation and an e-mail is sent to the police office 
to improve the efficiency of enforcement controls. The system was tested in Bilbao and 
the main evaluation results can be found in Blanco et al. (2012). 
To simulate the scenarios, we need to have a unique basis on which only parameters 
related to who invests would change. For that reason all simulations are made on Lyon’s 
conurbation, which counts about 1.900.000 inhabitants. Delivery space booking being 
more useful in city centres, we focus on the downtown, which is a very dense zone with 
a plethora of retailing, service and leisure activities. Using the tools of evaluation in this 
context, i.e. generalising local effects to a city point of view, we estimate the costs and 
the benefits for the two main stakeholders: the city (or the collective community) and 
the transport carriers (or individuals). 
We assume a VAT of 20% and, for each system personnel fees equal to those of 
employees working during the pilot implementation, operation and evaluation phases 
(in case of pilots in different cities, the retained costs will be précised in the 
corresponding section). Another important assumption concerns the time period where 
investments are made. Oppositely to public transport infrastructures (Hayashi and 
Morisugi, 2000), investments are not made in the first two years, but the systems are 
introduced gradually (Gonzalez-Feliu et al., 2013a). This assumption enforces that of 
money availability, i.e., we assume that money is available and no loans are required. 
Although that is a strong assumption, it can be set as a basis for comparison since it 
allows avoiding further artefacts related to loan refunding, which is a subject that merits 
specific research and will not be explored in this paper. Indeed, avoiding entering on 
loan refunding, we assume that all scenarios have equal refunding conditions, enforcing 
the comparability between them. 
The CBA will be made on a 10-year horizon, which is enough long to ensure a return 
of investment and enough short to not need a strong technology change or replacement 
during the operation period (Litman, 2004). We also assume the level of operating costs 
and revenues as constant over this period. The discount rate is assumed to be the French 
public one, i.e. 4%. This rate varies from one country to another, and can be updated (as 
well as personnel costs and VAT) when adapting the scenario assessment to cities of 
one precise country. Moreover, we define a target internal return rate (IRR) of 15% for 
the private company and 4% for the public entity. Last but not least, we assume that 
invested money is available by each investor, so no hypotheses on how the money is 
obtained are made. 
3.3 Model calibration and sensibility analysis 
The Cost-Benefit Analysis is made on the basis of a mathematical model which 
relates costs and benefits to several tactical and operational variables. Since the model is 
standard (Layard and Glaister, 1994), we are not re-proposing the entire model (the 
main calculations and cost determinants are presented in Gonzalez-Feliu et al., 2012). 
However, each cost-benefit model needs to be calibrated. Furthermore, it is also 
important to analyse the sensitivity of the proposed approach. To do this, a first 
simulation of a system with a deployment of 25 delivery bays equipped with the 
booking system, following the trends shown in Gonzalez-Feliu et al. (2013b), is made, 
i.e. considering four delivery bays the first year, and the addition of other five each year 
until the fourth one, where six delivery bays are installed.  
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First, costs are estimated and a starting fee is defined. A first CBA is made, then 
iteratively it is repeated changing the fee until an IRR of 4% or higher is obtained. For 
this analysis, we take an IRR of 4% since it corresponds to the requested minimum in a 
case of public investment where no loans are asked (i.e. considering the investment 
capital is available). This procedure leads to the definition of a starting fee of 250 € 
VAT included. 
 
 
Figure 1: Net Present Value trend in a 10-years horizon with 100 scheduled bookable 
delivery bays and a fee of 250 € per vehicle and year (including VAT) 
 
Once a reference situation is chosen and assessed, we make a set simulation changing 
the values of each group of variables. We assume a margin of 10% in cost estimations, 
i.e. we consider that each group of costs, either investment (infrastructure and civil 
works, on board unit acquisition, advertising) or operational (enforcement, back office 
maintenance, infrastructure maintenance). We observe that operational costs influence 
is higher than that of investment costs, since they are higher. For that reason, we 
separate them in three main categories: police enforcement costs, related to police 
controls to make the system be used only by trucks reserving it (and persuading cars to 
keep the place free for an usage by delivery vehicles only), back office maintenance 
costs, related to system and reservation management and technical maintenance, and 
infrastructure maintenance costs, related to DSB’s physical maintenance. 
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Table 1: Sensitivity analysis results 
  +10% 10 years IRR  Gap 
Initial Situation 5,87% - 
Investment costs 4,54% -1,33% 
Enforcement costs 3,78% -2,09% 
Back office maintenance costs 3,63% -2,24% 
Infrastructure maintenance costs 2,01% -3,86% 
   
-10% 10 years IRR  Gap 
Initial Situation 5,87% - 
Investment costs 7,23% +1,36% 
Enforcement costs 8,04% +2,17% 
Back office maintenance costs 8,20% +2,33% 
Infrastructure maintenance costs 10,03% +4,16% 
 
It is obvious that cost estimation rely on a limited information set that can lead to 
estimation errors. Such costs being of different nature and related to different sources, 
they have different impact on the overall IRR estimation. In order to understand the 
influence of such errors into the global estimation, we provide a table synthesising the 
main categories of costs and the IRR gaps when such costs are estimated with an      
error. Regarding our application case, it emerges that infrastructure maintenance 
dominates all other costs, since their influence leads to cost variations of about    , 
whereas the other operational costs lead to variations around    . Investment costs 
lead to variations of near    . In any case, we observe that a 10% variation on such 
costs has a small but non-negligible consequence on overall CBA. In other words, 
infrastructure maintenance costs have the highest influence on the overall IRR of a 
deployment project of a DSB network, having an impact factor of 0,4, which is the 
double of operational costs for back office maintenance or enforcement. This is due to 
the fact that, in the pilot, the technological solution needed to install captors that present 
high operational costs in terms of maintenance and replacement. Although new 
solutions are envisaged to reduce such costs, in the present simulation we exactly 
adopted the system of Bilbao. This implies to take care on well estimating operational 
costs, and highlights the importance of well dimensioning the network, since such costs 
are directly linked to the number of DSB deployed. 
3.4 Estimation of benefits 
After testing the cost-benefit model on the only basis of the costs, we need to define 
the benefits needed to make the project economically viable. To do this, it is necessary 
to define the maximum fee it can be asked to users. In other words, we need to examine 
the individual benefits for users in order to define the maximum value they would 
accept to pay for using the system. To estimate those costs on a comparable basis we 
assume that both investment and operational costs do not change in time. The details of 
those costs are found in Gonzalez-Feliu et al. (2012). They are summarized as follows: 
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Table 2: Main unitary costs (aggregated) 
Cost type Cost Unit 
Fixed investment costs 25 000 € 
Variable investment costs 2 500 €/ unit 
Fixed operational costs 45 000 €/ year 
Variable operational costs 1 000 €/ unit and year 
 
Individual benefits are related to a plethora of factors, which are not always easy to 
identify (Gonzalez-Feliu et al., 2013b). In this case, we have identified four direct 
benefits for a carrier. Such benefits are obtained from the different evaluation results of 
the system (Blanco et al., 2012): 
 Fuel savings, directly translated into economic gains (money savings related to 
fuel consumption). 
 Time savings, also directly translated into economic gains (money savings 
related to timetabling and working hours). 
 Distance savings, indirectly translated into economic gains (money savings 
related to vehicle usage). 
We make the assumption that the DSB areas will be created in order to consent the 
loading and unloading operations for carriers that are not DSB customers, i.e., to be 
developed in a non-congested situation. We extrapolate the results of Bilbao’s DSB 
evaluation with a small calibration concerning vehicles (details on evaluation and 
conversion are respectively seen in Blanco et al., 2013 and Gonzalez-Feliu et al., 2012). 
In this context, we assume a unitary fuel and CO2 savings per vehicle per DSB stop as 
follows: 
Table 3: Fuel and CO2 savings for DSB in a deployment situation 
Vehicle type Fuel savings (ml) CO2 savings (g) 
Van 0 0 
Small truck 32 82 
Big truck 40 101 
 
Moreover, it is assumed that after the third year of deployment, an operational 
threshold is reached, i.e., the number of DSB in the network allows a re-organization of 
delivery routes that allow visiting between 9 and 11 delivery bays in average. A speed 
gain related to congestion decreasing can be assumed. This gain is estimated to be about 
2 km/h in average in the considered area, i.e. an average gain in route of 20 min., 
corresponding to a time savings of 6% with respect to total travel time (Gonzalez-Feliu 
et al., 2012). Fuel savings are estimated in gram, then converted into litres using an 
average volumetric mass for fuel of 750 g/l (Gonzalez-Feliu et al., 2012). Moreover, a 
fuel cost of 1.3 €/l is assumed (this is the current value in France, according to CNR 
(2012), it can be updated to the current value for each country). The benefit table for the 
transport carrier is the following: 
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Table 4: Benefit monetary conversion, for each savings category 
Type of gain Economic gain per vehicle (€/year) 
Time savings 360 €/year 
Fuel savings 90 €/year 
Total savings 450 €/year 
 
With these assumptions, after year 5 and that each transport carrier would have an 
average benefit of 450 €/vehicle each year. After defining individual benefits for 
transport carriers, it is important to define the collective benefits in order to estimate the 
interest of municipal authorities on investing on such systems. Some of those benefits 
derive from those of transport carriers but others have to be estimated by taking into 
account global traffic on the DSB influence areas. The main benefits that have been 
identified are: 
 Time savings for personal and commercial trips, which can be translated into 
economic gains (money savings related to timetabling and working hours). 
However, since it is difficult to make this estimation, we assume an average 
cost of time according to World Bank (2005) for monetary value estimation of 
travel time.  
 Distance savings, indirectly translated into economic gains (money savings 
related to vehicle usage) are as for transport carriers savings, negligible. 
 CO2 savings, which can be related to economic gains if a Carbon Tax is 
assumed. The estimation method is made assuming a carbon tax for each 
transport carrier. Although the current value is 17€/ton, we aim to set it to 100 
€/ton, according to the last European Considerations (French Ministery of 
Land Use and Transport, 2005). Then, we estimate current traffic in concerned 
areas (for all personal, commercial and goods transport) on the basis of traffic 
distribution (Crozet et al., 2012), assuming a current distribution of vehicle 
types on the considered city and translating it to the traffic in the parts of the 
city where we supposed to have DSB systems operationally working. 
The collective benefits table is the following: 
Table 5. Collective benefit monetary conversion, for each savings category 
Type of gain Overall economic gain (€/year) 
Time savings 250 €/year and vehicle 
CO2 reduction 10 €/year and vehicle 
Total savings 260 €/year and vehicle 
 
The overall benefits by year are estimated to be comparable to those of investments, 
so that will justify a collective utility vision. 
4. Application examples, scenario assessment and results analysis 
To illustrate the interest of CBA, we propose various application examples of CBA 
using the DSB deployment example presented above. The first use of CBA we propose 
is related to dimensioning the delivery bays network. To do this, a socio-economic 
approach is taken, i.e., we think in terms of ERR and not of IRR. 
To dimension the network, it needs to be taken into account the conditions under what 
the expected benefits can be observed, i.e., each route needs to use between 8 and 11 
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DSB systems per day. Taking into account the average fleet of vehicles that use such 
systems (Pluvinet et al., 2010), we can state semi-articulated vehicles will seldom use 
them. Moreover, such vehicles deliver mainly in the early morning (Pluvinet et al., 
2012). Furthermore, delivery bays in France are set to a length standard, which allows 
dividing them into three sub-spaces in order to host either a semi-articulated vehicle, a 
single truck plus a small commercial vehicle or three small commercial vehicles. Taking 
into account the current usage of vehicles during the DSB demonstration and the 
average fleet of vehicles in Lyon (Pluvinet et al., 2012), we can set the average number 
of vehicles contemporaneously in a delivery bay to 2. Given a number N of delivery 
bays, the maximum weekly capacity C
week
 of the delivery bays can be defined as: 
C
week
=2*T
open
*N*P 
 
where P is the period of the week (in days) when the DSB system is active; T
open
 is the 
period of the day (in hours) during which the DSB are open to reservation. 
 
We assume that this period is 5.5 (i.e., from Monday to Friday plus Saturday 
morning), following the state-of-the-practice in Lyon (Pluvinet et al., 2012). Moreover, 
we see from evaluation results (Blanco et al., 2012) that DSB, if open to reservation, 
can be used up to 8.00 p.m.; for that reason we assume that each delivery bay is 
operational from 6.00 a.m. to 8.00 p.m.  
Taking into account that each vehicle makes in average 3.5 routes per week, the need 
of visiting at least 9 delivery bays, and the average size of the potential vehicles for 
DSB usage purposes, we can estimate the weekly need of capacity NC
week
 to ensure the 
system is working efficiently: 
NC
week
=3.5*9*m 
 
where m is the number of vehicles using the system. 
   
With that information, we can compare the weekly capacity of delivery bays to the 
need of capacity, given a set of vehicles using the system. Via the Cost Benefit Analysis 
tool, we can assess different cases, with the same assumptions, making then vary only 
the number of delivery bays and the number of vehicles using the system, then observe 
the consequent ERR to analyse the suitability of such network. Assuming a set of 2000 
users, this estimation has been made: 
 
Number of 
vehicles 
Number of 
DSBs 
Total capacity Need of 
capacity 
Residual 
capacity 
ERR 
2000 200 5133 7000 -27% 10% 
2000 250 6415 7000 -8% 15% 
2000 275 7078 7000 1% 9% 
2000 300 7700 7000 10% 9% 
2000 350 8983 7000 28% 5% 
2000 400 10266 7000 47% 1% 
 
This simulation confirms the sensitivity analysis conclusions, since the ERR is well 
related to the number of DSB systems in the network, but presents non-linear trends. 
Indeed, for a network in under-capacity (i.e. less than 275 DSBs) the ERR is higher than 
for a system with enough capacity, mainly due to the high operational costs for system 
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maintenance. When increasing the number of DSBs to 250, the ERR increases since the 
costs remain still less important than the socio-economic benefits related to increasing 
the capacity of the DSB network (some companies will not be able to use the system at 
their best, which would lead to a customers’ decrease, but also a lower impact on 
congestion decreasing and CO2 reduction). 
We observe from the proposed case that a threshold 300 DSB need to be reached to 
offer enough capacity and then obtain the expected environmental and social benefits. 
However, with a network of 275 DSBs, the ERR is about 9% in 10 years. For the two 
last cases (350 and 400 DSB), there is an over-capacity, and the economic investments 
are not compensated by the overall benefits. Moreover, the differences between 275 and 
300 DSB systems are small, both in terms of costs and benefits, and a 10% of residual 
capacity seems suitable to avoid a congestion of the system, according to a qualitative 
evaluation of the system’s usage (Blanco et al., 2012). For those reasons, a network of 
300 DSB systems has been chosen. 
Then, a second usage of Cost Benefit Analysis is that of defining suitable fees of 
users. To build a deployment scenario under realistic commercial, tactical and 
operational conditions, we suppose that the solution tested in Bilbao has been further 
developed and can be applied to existing parking machines in order to allow the 
possibility to make private car parking payment (for private parking places around the 
DSB) and booking operations for the DSB systems on the same machine. In that way, 
existing machines can be used for both private parking and DSB services. We suppose 
that all delivery bays with the DSB technology are deployed in a central area (about 3.5 
km²). A total number of 300 DSB will be operational in 5 years, and we assume a total 
number of users (per year) up to 2000 vehicles. We assume that one user corresponds to 
one vehicle and then one vehicle uses only one card. Because the cards can be lost, 
broken or stolen, we estimate that 15% of the users will need to replace their cards each 
year. The deployment trends of the system and the number of vehicles consequently 
using it are reported on the following table: 
Table 6: Deployment trends for the chosen scenario (respectively in total number of 
DSB systems and vehicles using them) 
 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6+ 
Number of DSB systems 0 40 110 180 250 300 300 
Number of vehicles in the DSB network 0 300 800 1300 1700 2000 2000 
 
Following the deployment trends shown in Table 2, we estimate for each scenario the 
costs and the benefits, starting on an initial fee of 250 € including VAT, and iteratively 
changing its value until obtaining a suitable IRR. We make the assumption that inflation 
has an equal effect on both costs and benefits. We iterate the calculation of the fee until 
a value of 8% is reached for IRR. After making the iterative analysis, we set the starting 
fee to 365 € including VAT. 
After that, a third usage of cost benefit analysis can be made to define the funding 
strategy of the network. To do this, we propose a scenario simulation on the basis of 5 
scenarios of public and/or private funding of the DSB system. The aim of the scenario 
assessment is then to define a fee of usage, so we are placed on user’s refunding and 
mixed strategies. We propose then 4 scenarios to assess: 
 S1: Public funding with a user’s refunding strategy. Investment and 
management costs covered by the public authority on the basis user’s 
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refunding. Public funds are only loaned for a part of investment costs then 
refunded back on the basis of the public funding interest rates. For this reason, 
and according to Bonnafous and Faivre d’Arcier (2013), an IRR of 8% is 
necessary to justify the economic feasibility of the system. 
 S2: Private funding with an user’s refunding strategy. Investment and 
management costs covered by a private company, on the basis of public 
delegation of service. No financing is made by public funds, and the company 
needs to ensure a minimum benefit that can be translated on an IRR of at least 
15%. 
 S3: Investment and operational costs covered by a private company, on the 
basis of public delegation of service. Costs of police controls are entirely 
covered by the public authorities and no IRR is requested. The company needs 
to ensure however an IRR of at least 15% based on overall investment and 
operational costs (without police enforcement). 
 S4: Management costs covered by a private company, on the basis of public 
delegation of service, with a public subsidy that covers all investment costs 
for years 0 to 5. That amount is funded by a public mechanism and no IRR is 
asked. The company needs to ensure however an IRR of at least 15% for 
operational costs. 
After defining the scenarios, they are assessed using the CBA method introduced 
above. In Table 7 we synthesise the results of the assessment: 
Table 7: Scenario simulation synthesis 
Scenario IRR ERR Yearly fee
3
 (per vehicle) 
S1 8.5% 34.1% 365 € 
S2 15.6% 30.0% 390 € 
S3 15.6% 34.6% 380 € 
S4 15.9% 42.9% 190 € 
 
We observe from the table the main differences in terms of IRR and ERR, ass well as 
the value of the yearly fee that has to be asked to transport carriers (per vehicle) to reach 
the expected IRR. In the current economic context a situation of free usage (i.e. without 
asking a fee) based on public utility is not viable, since at least operational costs and if 
possible a part of investment costs need to be refunded by the user to ensure its 
continuity. In that context different possibilities are shown. Scenario S1 leads to a fee of 
365 € in case of a total funding by public authorities, which ensures the best ERR and 
an IRR of 8.5%, which is, according to Bonnafous and Faivre d’Arcier (2013), 
acceptable for public authorities taking into account both inflation and interest rates 
variations. S2 and S3, which are quite similar, lead to similar results. The first needs a 
fee of 390 €, and the second a fee of 380 €, with similar IRR and ERR values. Note that 
the main difference between both situations arises on enforcement controls. Indeed, the 
first assumes a private control, made by mobility agents, whereas the second uses public 
police enforcement. In any case, the conclusions of both simulations are similar: yearly 
operational costs being quite similar to yearly investment costs for the first 5 years, even 
higher, the two main support actions seem to be arisen on either financing a part (or the 
                                               
3 Including VAT 
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totality) of investment costs or giving a yearly subsidy to cover operational costs. For 
that reason, S4 assumes a subsidy that covers investment costs. The resulting fee is 
much lower, i.e. 190 € with VAT. Obviously, this situation assumes that the collective 
authorities see an interest on financing the system, which is the case when the ERR is 
about 43%. So, only a strong support, mainly in terms of subsidy, can lead to a strong 
fee decreasing, which will directly impact the acceptability of the system by potential 
users. 
5. Conclusion 
Through an example derived from a real experiment and demonstration, this paper 
presented the main issues related to the financing of urban logistics solutions, 
specifically on the contribution cost benefit analysis on strategic decisions related to 
investment refunding. After presenting the main funding strategies in urban economics 
applied to urban logistics, we addressed the methodological issues of cost benefit 
analysis. Then, we adapted it to the case of deploying a network of delivery space 
booking systems in the city of Lyon (France), having the main results and conclusions 
of a demonstration of the same system carried out in Bilbao (Spain). Several examples 
of usage, on the example of deploying a delivery space booking network, are presented 
and discusses. From the different simulations, it is observed that the way the system is 
financed has strong impacts on both its individual cost(for potential users) and its 
attractiveness.  
From the scenario assessment, we observe that only public or only private strategies, 
with minor support, lead to few changes in terms of fee value. Only a strong financial 
support, as for example a subsidy to cover investment costs, has a positive impact on the 
fee to pay and then on the incitation to use the system. In any case, such results need to 
be discussed with the concerned stakeholders (both public and private) in order to reach 
consensus. To do this, further work to implement decision support tools will lead to the 
integration of multi-criteria methods to economic analysis 
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